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This paper examines the relationship between bank capital and loan
interest rates for a panel of UK banks covering altogether about three
quarters of the UK lending market. Our focus is on the cyclicality or
state-dependence of this relationship during the period from October
1998 to December 2012, i.e. the possibility that it differs between epi-
sodes of rapid credit expansion (when times are ‘good’, before the glob-
al credit crisis) and periods of crisis and moderate credit growth (the
‘bad’ times, or subsequent years).
There are limits to the conclusions that can be drawn from an ex-
ercise of this nature. Bank capital decisions are endogenously deter-
mined alongside loan supply and interest rate decisions, and
inﬂuenced also by loan demand. Our estimated coefﬁcients cannot
be reliably interpreted as representing the impact of an exogenousse the data. Views expressed in
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016.02.005policy change such as an increase in the level of bank regulatory cap-
ital requirements. Nonetheless, even though the estimations we re-
port are based on reduced-form models, they do provide some
insights into a key question: what theory provides an adequate and
consistent account of the portfolio and loan rate decisions of UK
banks before and after the crisis?
The reason that even a reduced-form estimation strategy may be in-
formative is that the most well-established theories prior to the crisis
share one common feature: they adopt modelling frameworks in which
bank portfolio choices are driven by bank speciﬁc factors such as
capitalisation, liquidity andmarket power in deposit and lendingmarkets.
Cyclicality can appear in these models but only exogenously through
changes in various explanatory model variables. Therefore these models
predict that, once fully controlling for bank-speciﬁc and macroeconomic
factors affecting loan supply and loan demand, then one should observe
stable relationships between bank capital and the different dimensions
of the bank portfolio decision such as the volume of bank loans and
bank loan interest rates.
Our estimation results and tests clearly reject this prediction, sug-
gesting instead that the association between bank capital ratios and
lending rates alters substantially from the pre-crisis (or ‘good times’)
period to the crisis (or ‘bad times’) period. For total bank lending, the
coefﬁcient on the Tier 1 capital ratio is signiﬁcantly positive pre-crisis
(October 1998–June 2007) and signiﬁcantly negative in the period com-
prising the crisis (July 2007–December 2012). The corresponding coef-
ﬁcient in regressions for secured household lending (residential
mortgages) is signiﬁcantly positive prior to the crisis and signiﬁcantlycapital ratios and lending rates, International Review of Financial Anal-
2 M. Osborne et al. / International Review of Financial Analysis xxx (2016) xxx–xxxnegative in the crisis period. For unsecured household lending we ﬁnd
instead a positive association in both the pre-crisis and crisis sub-
periods, but a signiﬁcant change in magnitude from relatively strong
to weak. Finally, for corporate loans we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative asso-
ciation pre-crisis and no association in the crisis period.
These ﬁndings are robust to various speciﬁcation tests that in-
clude: (i) formulating the panel model in ‘error correction’ form to
capture the short-run dynamics of loan rates, (ii) estimating the
panel model using rates on new business lending only, (iii) using
data sampled at the quarterly rather than monthly frequency, (iv)
explicitly controlling for bank- and time-varying regulatory capital
requirements, and (v) allowing not only for bank ﬁxed effects but
also time ﬁxed effects so as to ensure that all (observed and unob-
served) aggregate common factors inﬂuencing bank loan rate deci-
sions are controlled for.
As we have stated, many well-established theories of bank
decision-making are not consistent with this ﬁnding of pronounced
cyclical instability in the relationship between bank capital and lend-
ing rates. One example are those models in which bank capital pro-
vides banks with the incentive to apply effort to loan screening and
monitoring. This theory predicts that banks with higher capital will
make greater monitoring effort, lending more and offering lower
rates of interest, but provides no obvious explanation for cyclical
changes in the relationship between bank capital and loan interest
rates. The same is true of the extensive theoretical literature that
focuses on bank risk–return decisions. This literature provides a va-
riety of predictions about relationships between bank capital and
many dimensions of bank decision-making including lending rates,
but, again, it provides no easy explanation for cyclical variation in
those relationships.
Our ﬁnding of cyclical instability in the relationship between
bank capital and lending rates is though consistent with theoretical
perspectives on bank decision-making that have emerged since the
crisis, exploring endogenous variation in bank leverage and risk ap-
petite. This recent literature offers various rationales for changes in
bank's willingness to accept risk exposure, between periods of
rapid credit expansion – when, for example, the bank and its
investors are optimistic about returns or perceive risks are relatively
low – and periods of slow credit expansion or contraction – when
they may hold opposite views, becoming pessimistic about returns
or perceiving risks as being relatively high.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the
relevant theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 describes our
data and methodology. Section 4 presents the estimation results and
a battery of robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.
2. Prior literature
2.1. Theoretical perspectives
This section reviews theories about the relationship between bank
capital and other bank decisions (including lending rates), starting
with those theories that allow for a disciplinary role of capital or for
the interaction of capital structure and risk–return decisions.1
One branch of theory, epitomised by the work of Holmström and
Tirole (1997), emphasises the role of capital as a disciplining device en-
suring that banks have sufﬁcient ‘skin in the game’ to put the necessary1 For brevity, we focus on theoretical perspectives that provide relatively fully worked
outmodels of the relationship between bank capital and bank lending volumes and/or in-
terest rates. These are just one part of the broader literature exploring the reasons for de-
parture from the Modigliani–Miller propositions for banks; for comprehensive reviews,
see Miller (1995), and Berger, Herring, and Szegö (1995). Nor do we attempt any review
of the theory on the ‘bank lending channel’ initiated by Bernanke and Blinder (1988,
1992), inwhich better capitalised banks are predicted to respond less to changes in central
bank reserves because they can substitute alternative market funding for reserved
deposits.
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ciated with higher lending volume and lower lending rates. Other
models highlighting the disciplinary role of short-term wholesale
funding (e.g., Diamond & Rajan 2000) suggest the contrasting predic-
tion that a substitution of short-term debt funding for bank capital
will result in higher lending volume and lower lending rates.
A much larger body of theory incorporates risk and the role of bank
capital structure in bank risk–returndecisions. The seminal contribution
of Merton (1977) shows how deposit insurance provides bank share-
holders with a put-option on bank returns. Lower bank capital can in-
crease the magnitude of this put option (as it moves ‘into the money’)
and increase the bank's incentives for risk-taking. This analysis of bank
‘moral hazard’ can be extended to accommodate bank franchise value
or charter value lost in the event of failure (Marcus 1984; Keeley
1990). Under-capitalised banks may then seek to reduce their risk-
exposure so as to protect their charter value (if this incentive outweighs
the put option offered by the bank safety net).
These models of bank portfolio risk are further developed in the
bank capital, competition and risk-taking literature; e.g., in Hellmann,
Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) greater competition in deposit markets
can reduce charter value and lead to increased risk-taking. In Boyd
and De Nicoló (2005), greater competition lowers the interest rates
paid by bank borrowers in turn ameliorating agency costs in loan con-
tracts and reducing bank portfolio risk.
Thesemodels of bank risk–return decisionsmake ambiguous predic-
tions about the relation between risk exposure, the quantity of bank
lending and loan interest rates. A bank could increase its risk exposure
either by lowering loan interest rates and hence, increasing its lending
volume along a standard loan demand; or through a portfolio re-
allocation towards higher-risk assets that offer higher rates of return.
In both scenarios, the bank's overall risk exposure is increased but the
promised return, that is, the interest rate, can be either lower (in the
ﬁrst scenario) or higher (in the second scenario).
The common denominator of all these theories is that bank lending
and portfolio decisions are determined by a range of bank-speciﬁc and
aggregate factors. Once these factors are controlled for, one should ob-
serve a stable relationship between capital and loan interest rates
(and other dimensions of bank portfolio decisions such as bank
lending).
This is not the prediction of more recent (since the global ﬁnancial
crisis) contributions to the literature that emphasise the cyclicality of
both bank leverage and bank willingness to accept risk (‘risk-appetite’).
Prominent contributions are those provided by Geanakoplos (2010)
(this is per se not an analysis of banking but his models of leverage
can be applied to banks), Adrian and Shin (2011) and Borio and Zhu
(2012).
Various rationales have been provided for why this cyclical variation
might happen; for a review, see Gambacorta and Marquez-Ibañez
(2011). The ‘leverage cycle’ in Geanakoplos (2010) arises from the in-
teraction of heterogeneity in beliefs and constraints on borrowing. In
expansionary periods optimistic investors are willing to pay high prices
for assetswhich can generate a positive feedback– rising prices increase
the access of these borrowers to funding which further increases asset
prices.
A second rationale hinges on asset price volatility, notably in
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)where value-at-risk constraints de-
termine access to leverage. This predicts multiple equilibria with the
possibility of periods of low volatility, high asset prices and (by implica-
tion) high levels of lending; or high volatility, low asset prices and low
lending levels.
A third rationale is behavioural, with reference to potential investor
and intermediary irrationality. Periods of low interest rates and rapid
growth may lead investors and bankers to underestimate risks. In2 This approach incorporates bank capital into the extensive earlier literature on bank
monitoring and screening, originating with Leland and Pyle (1977) and Diamond (1984).
capital ratios and lending rates, International Review of Financial Anal-
3M. Osborne et al. / International Review of Financial Analysis xxx (2016) xxx–xxxBorio and Zhu (2012), during periods of low perceived risk and credit
expansion (such as the ‘great moderation’ that preceded the global ﬁ-
nancial crisis), banks see less need to hold much capital against risk;
more aggressive banks may operate with lower capital and more port-
folio risk. This cyclicality may be reinforced by increased credit demand,
a keymechanism in the Minsky (1986) model of ﬁnancial instability, or
by rises in the market value of bank capital (Borio, Furﬁne, & Lowe
2001). Another explanation offered by Gambacorta and Marquez-
Ibañez (2011) is that cyclical ﬂuctuations in bank lendingmay be driven
by incentive arrangements that focus excessively on short-term
performance.
This literature on cyclical leverage and risk-appetite is new and rel-
atively immature. It again offers a range of predictions. Some versions
– for example, those emphasising the role of asset price volatility and
value-at-risk constraints – suggest that the relationship between bank
capital and loan interest rates while varying cyclically might still be ex-
plained by aggregate market- or economy-wide factors. Other versions
of these newer theories (for example, those emphasising variation
across banks in their optimism about future asset returns or perceptions
of risk) explicitly introduce time-varying heterogeneity in bank behav-
iour, in which case the cyclical relationship between bank capital and
loan interest rates cannot be empirically modelled by the inclusion of
aggregate factors.20
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r2.2. Empirical literature
Given the wide range of theoretical predictions, it is important to let
the data speak on the relationship between bank capital and lending de-
cisions (and other bank portfolio decisions). Empirical studies yield a
range of ﬁndings.3 Various papers assess the impact of bank capital in
the US ‘credit crunch’ of the late 1980s and early 1990s (see Sharpe
(1995), for a review). Some ﬁndings suggest that declines in bank cap-
ital reduce loan supply (e.g., Bernanke & Lown 1991; Hancock &Wilcox
1993; Peek & Rosengren 1995). Several recent studies have examined
the relationship between bank capital and other dimensions of bank
decision-making during and following the global ﬁnancial crisis. Banks
with relatively illiquid asset portfolios were forced to deleverage
(Cornett, McNutt, Strahan, & Tehranian 2011). Better capitalised banks
increased balance sheet assets relative to other banks (Berger &
Bouwman 2013). Closest to our own ﬁndings are those of Košak, Li,
Lončarski, and Marinč (2015) who analysing a sample of annual bank
data examine the impact of bank capital on loan growth both pre-
crisis and during the crisis. Their ﬁndings indicate that higher levels of
capital and retail deposits are both associated with higher loan growth
rates, and that the impact of Tier 1 bank capital on loan growth is very
much higher during the crisis period.
Some empirical studies, like ours, assess the relationship between
bank capital and loan interest rates. Most take a ‘static’ approach in
which this relationship is assumed to be constant over time
(Saunders & Schumacher 2000; Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga 1999;
Carbó-Valverde & Rodríguez-Fernández 2007; Hubbard, Kuttner, &
Palia 2002; Santos & Winton 2010). But others report cyclical varia-
tion in the relationship between lending rates (or interest margins)3 Due to space constraints, we do not review in detail the empirical literature on the
‘bank lending channel’ and the role of bank capital in response to changes ofmonetary pol-
icy rates; e.g., Kashyap and Stein (2000); Angeloni, Kashyap, and Mojon (2003); Ashcraft
(2006) and Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, and Saurina (2012). But we can note some parallels
to our own ﬁndings, despite the notable differences in modelling approach. Gambacorta
and Marquez-Ibañez (2011) report cyclical variation in the bank lending channel while
Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, and Saurina (2014) and Ioannidou, Ongena, and Peydró
(2015) report increased risk-taking in response to cuts in monetary policy rates (but do
not assess cyclical variation).
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ysis (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2016.02.005and capital even before the global ﬁnancial crisis. Analysing UK syn-
dicated loan data, Steffen and Wahrenburg (2008) ﬁnd that
undercapitalised banks during the 1996–2005 period charge higher
interest rates during four episodes identiﬁed as recessionary.
Fischer et al. (2012) study US syndicated loans and ﬁnd that loan
margins and the lender's capital ratio are negatively linked from
1988 to 1992 when both regulatory changes and market pressure
force bank capital ratios upwards, and positively linked during
1993–2007 when banks operated in more benign conditions.3. Data description and methodology
3.1. Institutional features of UK bank lending markets
We brieﬂy describe some institutional features of the UK bank lend-
ing market. First, unlike in the US, there is relatively little ﬁxed interest
rate lending. Most mortgage lending is variable rate, either linked to
wholesale lending rates such as the Bank of England base rate (themon-
etary policy rate), LIBOR or evenmore commonly at variable rates set at
the discretion of lenders. Fixed rate residential mortgage lending is rel-
atively uncommon and typically rates are ﬁxed for only three to ﬁve
years.
Second, also in comparison to other countries, the amount of UK cor-
porate lending is relatively small. UK corporate lending (excluding com-
mercial property mortgages) is only around 15% of total sterling bank
lending and total UK corporate lending including commercial property
represents only around 30% of sterling total bank lending.
Third, the level of competition varies considerably from one lending
market to another. For residential mortgages and credit cards (themost
important form of unsecured household lending) there are many com-
peting providers. For corporate lending, especially SME borrowers,
there are relatively few lenders.
UK banks, like those in other countries, were affected by the
2007–2009 global ﬁnancial crisis (GFC). This arose in part because of
UK bank holdings of US dollar sub-prime and other structured credit se-
curities. But the main culprit was the extensive reliance of UK banks on
wholesale funding and on securitisation (the closure of these markets
was, for example, the reason for the failure of Northern Rock in Septem-
ber 2007).0
10
Fig. 1. Bank CDS prices. Bank CDS prices are obtained by averaging the prices of 1 year
senior, 1 year subordinated, 5 year senior and 5 year subordinated CDS contracts from
Credit Market Analysis (CMA) and Thomson Reuters. The resulting bank CDS prices are
expressed as ratios (in percentage) over the corresponding average of the bank CDS
price from December 2003 to December 2006. The ﬁgure shows the ratios for 6 of the
13 sampled banks on which data is available over the entire sample period.
capital ratios and lending rates, International Review of Financial Anal-
5 In an additional exercise we include the average CDS price on 5-year debt of banks in
ourmodels as amarketmeasure of bank risk. The variable is signiﬁcantly positively linked
with lending rates. However, CDS prices reﬂect banks' capital ratios aswell as the portfolio
risk of the banks, so we do not report these results.
6 The provisions data (Bank of England form PL) used to construct pit include debt in-
vestments as well as loans, as provisions data exclusively for loans are not available over
our entire sample period. To derive appropriate scalars for these variables we have con-
structed series for the stock of loans and investments which broadlymatch the provisions
data (using the Bank of England forms BT and BE).
7 The denominator is the total lending and deposits for all UK banks, not just those in
our sample, from the Bank of England http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/Pages/
bankstats/.
8 Bank size is known to be correlated with capital ratios, and for this reason is used in
4 M. Osborne et al. / International Review of Financial Analysis xxx (2016) xxx–xxxThe behaviour of end-of-month CDS prices for each UK bank based
on 1- and 5-year senior and subordinated debt contracts are indicative
of the impact of the crisis. Fig. 1 plots the resulting composite CDS
price as a percentage of its average pre-crisis 2004–06 value for each
bank. CDSprices rise sharply from July 2007, coincidingwith public con-
cerns about the valuation of structured products and a drying up of the
market for structured securities and for short-term asset-backed com-
mercial paper (Brunnermeier 2009).
3.2. Key variables: lending rates and capital ratios
We use conﬁdential data submitted by banks to the Bank of England
(BoE) and Financial Services Authority (FSA).4 During the sample peri-
od, banks authorised in the UK submitted detailed data to the FSA on
a quarterly basis on their balance sheets and capital adequacy. Large
commercial banks also submitted data that enables the calculation of ef-
fective interest rates (deﬁned below) to the BoE on a monthly basis,
largely for the purpose ofmonitoring the pass-through ofmonetary pol-
icy decisions into market interest rates.
Differences between the BoE and FSA forms limit the scope of our
sample. Whereas the FSA database covers every bank authorised in
the UK, the effective rates collected by the BoE pertain to a small num-
ber of large retail banks which are the most active in the UK lending
market. Unlike the BoE database, the FSA database does not include
branches of foreign banks or building societies (since primary responsi-
bility for their prudential supervision lies with the home regulator). Our
ﬁnal sample is necessarily limited to 13 large and UK-authorised banks
that report in both datasets. These 13 banks account for around 75% of
the UK lendingmarket over the 1998–2012 sample period under study.
The sample banks are observed over two contrasting periods; one of
exuberant credit conditions and benign macroeconomic performance
up to 2007, and another of ﬁnancial market stress and economic reces-
sion thereafter until the end of the sample in 2012. The main two vari-
ables, lending interest rates and capital ratios, are described next.
3.2.1. Effective lending rate
Banks submit to the FSA and BoE the average loan balances and in-
terest accrued each month, from which the annualised effective lending
rate
lit ¼
interest accrued duringmonth
averageloanbalancesduringmonth
 no:of days inyear
no:of days inmonth
ð1Þ
is calculated monthly from 1998 to 2012 for all loans, corporate loans,
household secured loans and household unsecured loans. From 2004
to 2012, we can also calculate the interest accrued on new loans agreed
during the month which allows for a better measure of the immediate
response to changing funding conditions (new business lending rates).
We opted for the effective rate after considering two alternative
sources of lending rates employed in extant studies. One is quoted inter-
est rates representing the interest rates advertised for new business,
which were used by Fuertes and Heffernan (2009) and Fuertes,
Heffernan, and Kalotychou (2010). These data have twomain disadvan-
tages: they do not include rates for large corporations which are gener-
ally not advertised; and they are quoted rather than agreed rates, which
means they do not reﬂect the lending rates actually offered to bor-
rowers (e.g., riskier borrowers may have to pay higher interest rates).
Others use agreed rates on syndicated loans, e.g. Hubbard, Kuttner,
and Palia (2002) and Santos and Winton (2010) in the US market, and
Steffen and Wahrenburg (2008) in the UK market. While these repre-
sent interest rates agreed by syndicates of banks, they only include
loans to large corporations and hence, do not include lending to house-
holds or to smaller businesses.4 The prudential functions of the FSA moved into the Prudential Regulatory Authority
(PRA) in 2013.
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Themeasure of bank capital ratio chosen for our empirical analysis is
kit ¼
Tier1capital
Totalassets
ð2Þ
instead of the ratio of Tier 1 capital to the regulatory measure of risk-
weighted assets. The main reason for this choice is that the risk-
weighted assets calculation has undergone major changes during the
sample period, speciﬁcally in 2007 when Basel II allows banks to use
their own internal models to determine credit risk weights, and in
2011 when the so-called “Basel 2.5” increased risk weights in the trad-
ing book and tightened eligibility criteria for regulatory capital. In addi-
tion, risk-weighted ratios have been much criticised post-crisis since
banks were able to increase leverage substantially while maintaining
healthy regulatory risk-weighted capital ratios (Turner 2009). We also
prefer Tier 1 capital (common equity, reserves and certain hybrid
equity-like securities) to the Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital. This is because
Tier 2 capital (subordinated debt and some hybrid instruments)was re-
vealed by the crisis not to be truly loss-absorbing on a going concern
basis.
3.3. Panel regression model and control variables
Ourmain reduced-formmodel, aimed at estimating the long-run as-
sociation between bank lending rates (lit) and bank capital ratios (kit),
can be formalised as follows.
lit ¼ Ai þ Kkit þ Rrit þ Ppit þ Ccit þWwit þ Ssit þMmit þ Ddit þ Bbt
þ F f t þ Ggt þ uit ð3Þ
This is a panel regression with bank ﬁxed effects (Ai) and various
controls tomitigate endogeneity arising from factors that simultaneous-
ly inﬂuence the lending interest rate and capital ratios; i=1,2,… ,N are
banks and t= 1,…,Ti are months (the panel is unbalanced with a max-
imum Ti of 148 months per bank, and an average Ti of 97 months). The
ﬁxed effects are aimed at capturing unobserved bank-speciﬁc heteroge-
neity such as the businessmodel. The estimationmethod is pooled ordi-
nary least squares (OLS).
The overall motivation for the control variables is to mitigate
endogeneity (omitted variable) bias in the coefﬁcient of interest K.
The controls (rit ,pit ,wit ,cit ,sit ,mit ,dit )' are bank-speciﬁc variables.5 The
ﬁrst four are measures of bank portfolio risk that, according to the the-
ories outlined in Section 2 above, can be expected to be correlated both
with lending rates and capital ratios. These are the ratio of risk-
weighted assets to total assets (rit), ratio of provisions to total loans
and other debt instruments (pit), ratio of write-offs to total loans (wit),
and ratio of corporate loans to total loans (cit).6
For the same reason, we also include each bank's total assets (sit,
expressed in £ billions) and measures of each bank's competitive posi-
tion, the share of loans (mit) and the share of total deposits (dit).7
These are standard controls in empirical banking.8most empirical studies of bank capital, e.g. Francis and Osborne (2012) and Jokipii and
Milne (2008) and especially important in the context of lending rates where large banks
may have lower funding costs (see Berger and Turk-Ariss 2015).
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tors aimed at controlling for business-cycle endogeneity arising from
common shocks that inﬂuence both the lending rate and the capital
ratio. The most obvious candidate is the BoE base rate that is the target
interest rate for UK monetary policy (bt, expressed as a monthly aver-
age). In practice, interest rates for interbank lending can diverge from
the BoE base rate due to expectations of losseswhich increase in periods
of stress, together with term structure risk or the premium associated
with lending at longer maturities. This motivates as control variable
the spread of 1-year LIBOR over the BoE base rate (ft, also as a monthly
average). Our third macroeconomic control is the output gap (gt) de-
ﬁned as the deviation of actual real GDP from “potential” or trend real
GDP to control for loan demand.9
We begin by estimating the long-run panel model (3) using total
lending rates (lit) as the dependent variable. Then we re-estimate the
model for household secured loans (lithsec), household unsecured loans
(lithunsec) and lending rates on corporate loans (litcorp). Accordingly, we re-
deﬁne the ratio of write-offs to loans in each of these sectoral models as
wit
hsec, withunsec and witcorp respectively, to reﬂect the speciﬁc risks in each
loan category. We also redeﬁne the loan market share variables as mit-
hsec ,mithunsec and mitcorp to reﬂect the bank's competitive position in each
of these loan sub-markets. The sampling frequency is monthly for all
variables except capital ratios (kit), output gap (gt) and write-offs (wit)
which are only available quarterly. We convert them to monthly by lin-
ear interpolation.
We estimate themodel using the entire sample togetherwith a crisis
dummy interacted with all the variables (including the bank ﬁxed ef-
fects) to accommodate changes from the ‘good times’ period to the
‘bad times’ period in all the model parameters. Such a model produces
identical results to estimating separate models for the two sub-
periods, but has the advantage that it enables standard tests for the sig-
niﬁcance of parameter changes. The crisis dummy takes value 0 from
the beginning of the sample on October 1998 until June 2007 (the
‘good times’ period), and 1 from July 2007 until the sample end on De-
cember 2012 (the ‘bad times’ period). The choice of July 2007 as the cut-
off point is grounded empirically on the evolution of the banks' CDS
prices since these are likely to reﬂect investor sentiment about each
bank (Fig. 1). The reason for including all months up to December
2012 in the ‘bad times’ period is that, although the acute liquidity crisis
was essentially resolved by early 2009, the banking sector continued to
be distressed due to low capital levels and the risk of losses stemming
from the European sovereign debt crisis. As shown in Fig. 1, the CDS in-
dices remain at a higher level through 2009–2012.
3.4. Robustness tests
In order to assess the robustness of the results, we carry out various
robustness checks. We begin by embedding the long-run model (3) in
lagged form, rewritten as li ,t− j= li ,t− j⁎+ut− j, into a dynamic error cor-
rection model (ECM) which can be formalised as.
Δlit ¼ ci þ
XH
h¼1
βLhΔli;t−h þ
XH
h¼0
βh 0ΔZi;t−h þ δ li;t− j−li;t− j þ eit : ð4aÞ
Model (4a) ismore general in that it nestsmodel (3) and additional-
ly captures the short-run dynamics of lending rates; the vector
Zit≡(kit,rit,pit,wit,cit,sit,mit,dit,bt, ft,gt)' gathers all the control variables.
An ECM is previously used, for instance, by Fuertes and Heffernan
(2009) and Fuertes, Heffernan, and Kalotychou (2010) to analyse the
long-run relationship between UK retail bank interest rates and the9 The source of the output gap data is the OECD Economic Outlook.
Please cite this article as: Osborne, M., et al., In good times and in bad: Bank
ysis (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2016.02.005BoE base rate while simultaneously capturing their short-run behav-
iour. In this formulation, the lending rate changes (Δlit) in response to
deviations of the current lending rate lit− j from its long-run path lit− j⁎
which is often referred to as the cointegration path; the economic intu-
ition behind the concept of cointegration is that lit⁎ acts as an attractor
for the interest rate lit over the long run so that the deviation (lit− j−
lit− j⁎) can be conceptualised as a zero-mean stationary process. Hence,
the term δ(li , t− j− li , t− j⁎) has the interpretation of an error correction
or catch-up mechanism that pulls the loan rate towards its long run
path lit⁎ in the wake of exogenous shocks.10
Accordingly, the above ECM can be conveniently re-parameterised
as follows.
Δlit ¼ πi þ
XH
h¼1
βLhΔli;t−h þ
XH
h¼0
βh 0ΔZi;t−h þ δLlt− j þ δZt− j þ eit ð4bÞ
where δL and δ≡(δK,δR,δP,δW,δC,δS,δM,δD,δB,δF,δG)' are long-run param-
eters. Therefore, the long-run effect of the capital ratio on the lending
rate can now be obtained as K=−δK/δL. Similarly, the long-run effects
of the controls gathered in Zit are given by the corresponding coefﬁcient
in the vector δmultiplied by−1/δL. The crucial short-run effect, accord-
ing to the goal of this paper, is the coefﬁcient that measures the associ-
ation between the capital ratio and lending rate which is given by
βK ¼∑
H
h¼0
βKh : Model (4b) also includes bank-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects and is
estimated by OLS.
The appropriate lag parameter j in the long-run component of the
model, that is, the “error correction”mechanism that drives the lending
rate towards its long-run path, is identiﬁed using the Akaike Informa-
tion Criterion (AIC). This lag length reﬂects rigidities in the lending
rate (e.g., difﬁculties in renegotiating contractual terms) that may pre-
vent changes in the key variables driving the long run path, lit⁎ , from
immediately materializing as changes in the lending rate, Δlit. For this
identiﬁcation purpose, we begin by estimating a baseline ECM with no
additional lags of theﬁrst-differenced variables (H=0) but considering
different values for the lag parameter j (from 1 to 6 months) in δLlt− j
and in the different variables Zt−j that drive the long-run path. We se-
lect the lag that minimises the AIC. This lag length identiﬁcation process
is conducted for each (overall and sectoral loans) model, since loans in
each sector may have different maturity proﬁles or contractual features
which inﬂuence the mechanism of “catch-up” towards the long-run
path. Once the appropriate lag length j is identiﬁed, we augment the
equation with asmany short-term lags h=1,2,… ,H as required to ab-
sorb the residual autocorrelation.
The lagged dependent variable (Δli ,t−h) can induce a bias in dynam-
ic panel regression although any lagged-dependent-variable bias is like-
ly to be small in our ECM estimation given the large T dimension (about
150 months) relative to the cross-section dimension (N=13 banks) of
our sample. The most common method of dealing with this bias is to
adopt the General Method of Moments (GMM) estimation; however,
this is precluded in our context because of the small N. Alternative,
one can estimate the ECM using the Corrected Least Squares Dummy
Variable estimator of Bun and Kiviet (2003) and Bruno (2005) which
is appropriate for small N; hence, we take this route. The bias-
corrected coefﬁcients are very close to those obtained by standard
pooled OLS and so we only report the latter below.10 Wedeployed the panel AugmentedDickey Fuller (ADF) test on each of the variables in
(2) in the pre-crisis and crisis periods and in the majority of cases (including our key var-
iables of interest, the lending interest rate and the capital ratio) the null hypothesis of a
unit root cannot easily be rejected.
capital ratios and lending rates, International Review of Financial Anal-
 A) Lending Interest Rate B) Write-Off Ratio and Output Gap
C) Tier 1 Capital Ratio D) New Business Lending Interest Rate
Fig. 2. Lending rates, write-offs and Tier 1 capital. Panels A to C plot average (across banks) loan interest rates, write-offs ratios alongside the output gap, and Tier 1 capital over the sample
period October 1998 to December 2012. Panel D shows the average (across the 13 banks in the sample) interest rate on new loans granted each month from January 2004 to December
2012. These new loan rates are not strictly comparable to those graphed in Panel A as the new business rates cover slightly different categories of loans. See http://www.bankofengland.co.
uk/statistics/Documents/reporters/defs/def_er2014.pdf.
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these robustness checks is re-estimation of the long-run panel model,
Eq. (3), with quarterly data to address concerns that observing the cap-
ital ratios, write-offs and output gap quarterly and then interpolating
them to monthly observations might have contaminated our earlier
ﬁndings.
The second robustness check is the inclusion of the capital require-
ment set by the FSA (denoted krit) as additional control variable in
Eq. (3) to mitigate another potential source of endogeneity bias for
the coefﬁcient of interestK inmodel (3). Capital requirements can inﬂu-
ence a bank's capital ratios and at the same time correlate with a bank's
lending strategy and hence, inﬂuence the pricing and/or risk of loans;
e.g., a bank pursuing a risky expansionary business strategymay be sub-
ject to higher capital requirements by the regulator.11 Capital require-
ments also changed substantially over the sample period.12
The additional control variable krit included in Eq. (3) for these pur-
poses is the regulatory capital requirement set by the FSA until April
2008 as the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets multiplied by11 Francis and Osborne (2012) and Aiyar, Calomiris, and Wieladek (2014) provide evi-
dence of these links for the UK market. See also the literature cited in Section 2.2 on the
US ‘credit crunch’ in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
12 The pre-crisis capital requirements were set at the level of the regulatory risk-
weighted total capital ratio and varied across banks and over time according to FSA judge-
ments (see Francis and Osborne 2012). From 2008, Tier 1 capital ratios rose substantially
as the FSA set higher benchmark expectations for ﬁrms in the context of the government
support package for major banks, including a minimum Tier 1 capital ratio of 8%.
Please cite this article as: Osborne, M., et al., In good times and in bad: Bank
ysis (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2016.02.005the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets. From April 2008 on-
wards, we replace this capital requirement variable with a ﬂat 8% ratio
of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets multiplied by the bank's ratio
of risk-weighted assets to total assets wherever this exceeds the bank-
and time-speciﬁc FSA capital requirement.
A third robustness check as regards estimation of Eq. (3) includes
monthly time ﬁxed-effects instead of the macroeconomic control vari-
ables (bt, ft,gt)'. The purpose is to ensure that our earlier results are not
biased due to omission of other aggregate effects.
A ﬁnal robustness check is an estimation of the long-run model (3)
for total and sectoral lending using monthly data on new business
loans deﬁned as new loans or renegotiated outstanding loans during
the month. This re-estimation is rather limited on two accounts. The
ﬁrst limitation is that data are available only for the period
2004–2012. The second limitation is that the portfolio-risk control var-
iables (rit ,pit ,wit ,cit) and the loan market share variable (mit) refer to
existing business lending not to new business lending.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Preliminary data analysis
The dynamics of monthly bank lending rates (lit), write-offs to total
loans (wit) and Tier 1 capital ratio (kit) during the entire sample period –
October 1998 to December 2012 – is illustrated in Fig. 2. The graphs
show means across all the i= 1,…,N banks (N= 13).
Panel A shows the averagemonthly lending rate for all loans, house-
hold secured loans, household unsecured loans and corporate loanscapital ratios and lending rates, International Review of Financial Anal-
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for lending rates, capital ratios and controls.
Full sample Pre-crisis period Crisis period
Mean StDev Mean StDev Mean StDev
I. Bank-speciﬁc variables
Lending rate (lit) 6.02 1.51 6.51 1.24 4.73 1.40
Household secured lending rate lithsec 5.46 1.38 5.91 0.83 4.63 1.76
Household unsecured lending rate lithunsec 10.14 1.89 10.15 2.15 10.09 1.07
Corporate lending rate litcorp 5.69 1.87 6.43 1.17 3.72 1.94
Tier 1 capital ratio (kit) 3.61 1.55 3.29 1.29 4.46 1.84
Capital requirement (krit) 2.03 0.80 1.99 0.80 2.14 0.81
Risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio (rit) 40.80 17.30 44.63 17.63 30.68 11.32
Provisions to loans and investments ratio ρit 0.77 0.58 0.83 0.58 0.59 0.53
Corporate loans to total loans ratio (cit) 20.44 15.56 20.09 1.67 21.35 13.30
Write-offs to loans ratio (wit) 1.95 1.86 1.61 16.33 2.87 2.02
Household secured write-offs to loans ratio withsec 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.08
Household unsecured write-offs to loans ratio withunsec 3.10 2.92 2.29 2.18 5.00 3.49
Corporate write-offs to loans ratio witcorp 0.74 1.31 0.48 0.69 1.41 2.09
Total assets, £bn (sit) 258 258 156 151 526 289
Share of total loans (mit) 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.12 0.05
Share of household unsecured loans (mitunsec) 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.04
Share of household secured loans (mitsec) 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.06
Share of corporate loans (mitcorp) 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.04
Share of deposits (dit) 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.03
II. Macroeconomic variables
BoE base rate (bt) 3.99 1.86 4.81 0.80 1.84 2.11
1y LIBOR spread to BoE base rate (ft) 0.50 0.48 0.33 0.40 0.97 0.35
Output gap (gt) 0.10 2.26 1.02 0.78 −2.31 2.98
Notes: The table reports the mean and standard deviation of all variables pooled across banks and months in pre-crisis (October 1998–June 2007) and crisis (July 2007–December 2012)
periods. Lit is the lending rate as deﬁned in (1) measured for all loans and, separately, for household (un)secured loans and corporate loans. Kit is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total (un-
weighted) assets.Krit is the capital requirement set by the FSA regulator as explained in Section 2.4 of themain text.Rit is the ratio of risk-weighted to total assets. Pit is the ratio of provisions
to total loans and debt investments. Cit is the ratio of corporate loans to total loans.Wit is the ratio ofwrite-offs to total loansmeasured separately for household (un)secured and corporate
loans. Sit is the total assets of each bank expressed in £ billions.Mit is each bank's share of loans which is measured separately for household (un)secured and corporate loans. Dit is each
bank's share of total deposits. bt is the target overnight interest rate set by the BoE. ft. is the spread of the 1 year LIBOR rate over the bank rate. gt is the OECD estimate of the UK output gap.
13 Similar unreportedWald tests for the signiﬁcance of changes in eachof the othermod-
el parameters revealed that the change from pre-crisis to crisis is not just conﬁned to the
Tier 1 capital ratio coefﬁcient.
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tracked the BoE base rate fairly closely with a spread of between 50
and 150 basis points (bp) for household secured loans and corporate
loans and 400–700 bp for household unsecured loans, reﬂecting a nota-
bly larger credit risk premium for the latter. In 2008 there is a profound
shift as the BoE base rate fell to an historic low of 50 bp and the spread
between lending rates and BoE base rate widened considerably to
300 bp for household secured and corporate loans and to 800 bp for
household unsecured loans. The wider spread is likely to reﬂect both
heightened loan credit risk premia and increases in banks' cost of
funding due to investors' concerns about bank creditworthiness, as
demonstrated by the CDS dynamics shown in Fig. 1 and the spread
between the BoE base rate and the 1-year LIBOR rate shown in Fig. 2
(Panel A).
Panel B of Fig. 2 shows the average write-offs over total loans for
household secured lending, household unsecured lending and cor-
porate lending. Again there is a clear contrast between the pre-
crisis period and the crisis period. Household unsecured loans have
a write-offs ratio of 1–2% in the pre-crisis period which doubles to
around 5–8% in the crisis period, after which it broadly returns to
pre-crisis levels. Corporate loan write-offs are between 0.3% and
0.7% in the pre-crisis period but rise to between 2% and 4% in the cri-
sis period. Household secured write-offs are 0.01–0.03% pre-crisis
and increase to around 0.08–0.13% during crisis period, before de-
clining to 0.04–0.05% thereafter.
Panel C of Fig. 2 shows the average of bank Tier 1 capital ratios and
their risk-weighted version. Both fell between 2004 and 2007 and
then rose notably thereafter. Finally, the new business loan rates are
shown in Panel D of Fig. 2. As one would expect, new business rates
are more volatile than existing rates. Nonetheless, despite signiﬁcant
spreads opening up in particular months of both positive and negative
sign, there is no visual evidence that these spreads persist for any length
of time.Please cite this article as: Osborne, M., et al., In good times and in bad: Bank
ysis (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2016.02.005The sample distribution of each variable (data pooled across banks
and months) is summarised in Table 1 over the entire 1998–2012 peri-
od, the ‘good times’ or pre-crisis period (up to June 2007) and the ‘bad
times’ or crisis period (from July 2007 onwards).
The capital ratio, write-offs to total loans ratio and LIBOR spread are
much lower pre-crisis than in crisis. The BoE base rate, lending rates and
output gap are also much lower in crisis. The risk-weighted assets to
total assets ratio is lower in the crisis period. Lending rates are the
highest for unsecured lending, and fall little in the crisis period. The
household secured and corporate loan rates are generally lower, and
fall more notably in the crisis period.4.2. Estimation results
Table 2 reports the estimation results for the baselinemodel, Eq. (3),
adding interaction variables (i.e., the crisis dummy variable interacted
with all other variables) so as to allow for full parameter heterogeneity
from ‘good times’ to ‘bad times’. We focus our discussion primarily on
the main parameter of interest, the coefﬁcient K on the Tier 1 capital
ratio, and we report Wald tests for the change in this parameter only,
for space constraints.13
In the all-loans regression, the model parameter K is signiﬁcantly
positive during the pre-crisis period and becomes signiﬁcantly negative
during the crisis period. Turning to the different sub-categories of lend-
ing, there is a similarly large change, economically and statistically, in
the coefﬁcient K for both household secured (residential mortgage)
and household unsecured lending. While for both household secured
and unsecured loans the capital ratios versus lending rates associationcapital ratios and lending rates, International Review of Financial Anal-
Table 2
Estimation results for long-run model of lending rates.
All loans Household secured Household unsecured Corporate
Variable (coefﬁcient) Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis
Tier 1 capital ratio (K) 0.048*** −0.084*** 0.077*** −0.065*** 0.181*** 0.051** −0.223*** −0.016
(0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.042) (0.021) (0.029) (0.016)
Wald test statistic (prob), Ho: Kpre-crisis = Kcrisis 37.28 [0.000] 57.53 [0.000] 6.52 [0.011] 27.45 [0.000]
Risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio (R) −0.004** −0.009*** −0.008*** −0.009*** −0.031*** −0.022*** 0.007** −0.009***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Provisions to loans and investments ratio (P) 0.017 −0.021 −0.149*** 0.043 0.021 −0.581*** 0.093 0.064
(0.035) (0.069) (0.040) (0.068) (0.099) (0.100) (0.065) (0.076)
Corporate loans to total loans ratio (C) 0.003 0.044*** 0.006** 0.016*** 0.003 0.013*** 0.029*** 0.008**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Write-offs to loans ratio (W) 0.049*** 0.007 0.012* 0.053*** −0.005 −0.058*** −0.041** 0.004
(0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.024) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Total assets (S) −0.000*** −0.001** −0.001*** 0.001*** −0.001*** 0.002*** −0.001** −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Share of total deposits (D) −1.521* −4.850*** −4.090*** 3.497*** 9.704*** −1.044 11.820*** 0.164
(0.780) (0.742) (0.507) (0.694) (1.615) (0.833) (1.258) (0.637)
Share of total loans (M) −2.514*** −3.030***
(0.804) (1.096)
Household secured
Write-offs to loans ratio (Whsec) −0.616*** 0.569***
(0.173) (0.199)
Share of loans (Mhsec) −2.469*** 1.350*
(0.681) (0.794)
Household unsecured
Write-offs to loans ratio (Whunsec) 0.053** 0.007
(0.024) (0.008)
Share of loans (Mhunsec) 5.418* −4.524***
(2.841) (1.709)
Corporate
Write-offs to loans ratio (Wcorp) 0.234*** −0.016
(0.035) (0.016)
Share of loans (Mcorp) −18.703*** 4.159***
(1.347) (1.604)
BoE base rate (B) 0.864*** 0.637*** 0.849*** 0.584*** 0.859*** 0.242*** 0.816*** 0.961***
(0.011) (0.025) (0.010) (0.024) (0.030) (0.035) (0.021) (0.027)
1y LIBOR spread to BoE base rate (F) 0.032 −0.030 0.051*** −0.009 0.188*** −0.094 0.013 0.019
(0.023) (0.053) (0.020) (0.051) (0.060) (0.075) (0.042) (0.059)
Output gap (G) −0.246*** −0.050*** −0.266*** −0.026 −0.574*** −0.010 −0.107*** −0.077***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.045) (0.026) (0.031) (0.020)
No. of observations (T'N) 1715 1309 1556 1707
No. of banks (N) 13 10 12 12
Adjusted-R2 0.962 0.971 0.877 0.929
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the long-run Eq. (3) for lending rates with ﬁxed bank effects. The data are monthly from October 1998 to June 2007 (pre-crisis period) and from
July 2007 to December 2012 (crisis period) for N banks. See note to Table 1 for variable deﬁnitions. The numbers in parentheses are Newey–West h.a.c. standard errors. The numbers in
square brackets are p-values.
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secured loans) or changes sign (secured loans) in the ‘bad times’.
The results for corporate lending also reveal a signiﬁcant change in K
from the ‘good times’ to the ‘bad times’. This change is, however, in the
opposite direction to that detected for the two categories of household
lending. Pre-crisis, the capital ratios versus loan rates association is sig-
niﬁcantly negative whereas during the crisis period the corresponding
coefﬁcient becomes essentially zero suggesting no association. As re-
vealed by the Wald test statistics in Table 2, all of these changes in the
coefﬁcient K are highly signiﬁcant.
We brieﬂy comment on the estimates of the coefﬁcients pertaining
to the control variables in Table 2. The share of corporate loans (cit) is
consistently positive and larger during the crisis (with the exception
of corporate lending where the coefﬁcient falls during the crisis). Bank
size and loan and deposit market share are negative and highly signiﬁ-
cant in the total loan model. For individual loan sectors, these variables
are also highly signiﬁcant, though there is amixture of positive and neg-
ative coefﬁcients.
The coefﬁcient of the BoE base rate (bt) is positive and signiﬁcant
throughout, unsurprisingly. The coefﬁcient of the output gap (gt) is con-
sistently negative, but lower in the crisis period than pre-crisis, andPlease cite this article as: Osborne, M., et al., In good times and in bad: Bank
ysis (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2016.02.005while always signiﬁcant pre-crisis it becomes insigniﬁcant during the
crisis period for both categories of household lending.
We interpret the signiﬁcant changes reported in Table 2 for the
coefﬁcient K on the capital ratio in our loan rate regressions as evi-
dence of a cyclical change in risk appetite of the kind discussed in
the newer literature on cyclical bank leverage and risk appetite.
Note that this interpretation can explain our ﬁnding of a signiﬁcant
change in sign of the coefﬁcient K that is of the opposite direction
for corporate lending and for household lending. This is a conse-
quence of the theoretical ambiguity about the relationship between
risk appetite and lending rates discussed above in Section 2. Risk
may be reduced in the crisis either by raising loan rates along a
loan demand function for one category of lending (this might be
the case for the household secured lending) while at the same time
changing the composition of lending from relatively high risk loans
offering higher rates of interest to relatively low risk loans offering
lower interest rates for another category of lending (this might be
the case for the corporate lending).
Turning to the robustness tests, the estimation results for the ECM
speciﬁcation (4b) that captures long- and short-term mechanisms are
shown in Table 3. To preserve space, we report the long-run parameterscapital ratios and lending rates, International Review of Financial Anal-
Table 3
Estimation results for error correction model of lending rates.
All loans Household secured Household unsecured Corporate
Variable (coefﬁcient) Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis
A. Long-run effects
Tier 1 capital ratio (K) 0.068* −0.004 0.120 −0.180 0.283** 0.099 −0.265*** 0.132
(0.040) (0.041) (0.103) (0.121) (0.135) (0.068) (0.086) (0.107)
Wald test statistic (prob), Ho: Kpre-crisis = Kcrisis 1.59 [0.207] 3.53 [0.060] 1.48 [0.224] 8.32 [0.004]
Risk-weighted assets to total assets ratio (R) −0.009** −0.016** 0.010 0.010 −0.040*** −0.020* 0.014 −0.038*
(0.004) (0.007) (0.016) (0.020) (0.014) (0.012) (0.009) (0.020)
Provisions to loans and investments ratio (P) 0.097 0.211 −0.506 0.217 0.044 −0.276 0.058 0.438
(0.088) (0.188) (0.332) (0.466) (0.312) (0.312) (0.190) (0.465)
Corporate loans to total loans ratio (C) −0.001 0.047*** −0.013 0.012 0.003 0.017 0.032*** −0.001
(0.005) (0.008) (0.020) (0.017) (0.022) (0.011) (0.009) (0.020)
Write-offs to loans ratio (W) 0.070*** 0.137*** −0.014 −0.033 0.018 0.019 −0.032 −0.073
(0.023) (0.049) (0.052) (0.120) (0.080) (0.083) (0.050) (0.118)
Total assets (S) −0.001* −0.001** 0.001 −0.000 −0.002* 0.002** −0.000 −0.002
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Share of total deposits (D) −0.242 −4.692** −3.462 6.445 18.015*** −0.772 11.911*** 0.097
(1.983) (1.970) (3.948) (4.593) (5.164) (2.600) (3.726) (3.833)
Share of total loans (M) −2.509 −5.895**
(2.061) (2.968)
Household secured
Write-offs to loans ratio (Whsec) −1.500 −9.325
(1.368) (25.892)
Share of loans (Mhsec) −11.460* −2.401
(6.056) (5.109)
Household unsecured
Write-offs to loans ratio (Whunsec) 0.046 −0.058
(0.078) (0.104)
Share of loans (Mhunsec) 3.922 −7.124
(9.060) (5.270)
Corporate
Write-offs to loans ratio (Wcorp) 0.333*** 2.381
(0.104) (4.330)
Share of loans (Mcorp) −16.428*** 14.652
(3.957) (10.009)
BoE base rate (B) 0.855*** 0.623*** 0.691*** −0.252 0.904*** 0.229* 0.839*** 0.929***
(0.030) (0.080) (0.096) (0.350) (0.098) (0.130) (0.065) (0.197)
1y LIBOR spread to BoE base rate (F) 0.424*** −0.127 0.859*** 1.284** 0.542** 0.115 0.214 0.125
(0.076) (0.157) (0.264) (0.584) (0.243) (0.261) (0.155) (0.394)
Output gap (G) −0.190*** −0.015 −0.331** 0.504** −0.423*** 0.021 −0.024 0.037
(0.042) (0.058) (0.131) (0.231) (0.148) (0.096) (0.093) (0.147)
B. Short-run effect
Tier 1 capital ratio (bK) 0.014 0.010 0.066* −0.009 0.081 0.073 −0.078 0.049
(0.039) (0.037) (0.036) (0.029) (0.076) (0.069) (0.061) (0.057)
No. of observations (T'N) 1702 1269 1544 1695
No. of banks (N) 13 10 12 12
Adjusted-R2 0.374 0.315 0.111 0.222
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the Error Correction Model for lending rates with ﬁxed bank-speciﬁc effects, Eq. (4b), with enough short-term lags (H) to absorb all residual au-
tocorrelation. The data aremonthly from October 1998 to June 2007 (pre-crisis period) and from July 2007 to December 2012 (crisis period) forN banks. The long-run effect of the capital
ratio (kit) on the lending rate (lit) ismeasured by the composite parameter K=−δK/δL as shown in the table; likewise, for all the other variables. The short-run effect of the capital ratio on
the lending rate ismeasured by the composite parameterβK ¼∑
H
h¼0
βKh . See note to Table 1 for variable deﬁnitions. The numbers in parentheses are Newey–West h.a.c. standard errors. The
numbers in square brackets are p-values.
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focus on the parameter of interest (βK) concerning the capital ratio.
The results on the long-run association between bank capital ratios
and lending rates obtained from the ECM are broadly consistent with
those from the long-runmodel (3). In particular, theWald test statistics
still reveal a signiﬁcant change frompre-crisis to crisis for household se-
cured and corporate loans. For household secured rates and corporate
rates, the change observed in the short-run coefﬁcient βK from pre-
crisis to crisis is aligned with the direction of the change in the long-
run coefﬁcient K, which emphasises the evidence.
All the remaining robustness tests concerning the long-run model
(3) are gathered in Table 4. We report only the coefﬁcient of interest K
and the correspondingWald test statistic for the signiﬁcance of change
from the pre-crisis to crisis periods. The unreported coefﬁcients on the
control variables (the same controls as those used in our baselinePlease cite this article as: Osborne, M., et al., In good times and in bad: Bank
ysis (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2016.02.005analysis summarised in Table 2) do not change much from one robust-
ness check to another; the full set of estimation results are available
from the authors upon request.
Panel I of Table 4 reproduces our baseline estimates ofK from Table 2
for comparison. Panel II reports the same coefﬁcient estimates using
quarterly data. Panel III reports the coefﬁcient estimateswhen including
capital requirements as an additional control. In both of these panels the
reported coefﬁcient estimates and theWald test statistic for the null hy-
pothesis of no-change in K are almost unchanged from the baseline re-
sults in Panel I.
Panel IV reports the coefﬁcient estimates K and correspondingWald
tests when replacing the three macroeconomic controls with time
ﬁxed-effects. The coefﬁcient estimates for all loans and household se-
cured lending are little changed. For household unsecured lending K
now switches from signiﬁcantly positive pre-crisis to signiﬁcantlycapital ratios and lending rates, International Review of Financial Anal-
Table 4
Robustness tests for long-run model of lending rates.
All loans Household secured Household unsecured Corporate
Variable (coefﬁcient) Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis Pre-crisis Crisis
I. Baseline estimates (from Table 2)
Tier 1 capital ratio (K) 0.048*** −0.084*** 0.077*** −0.065*** 0.181*** 0.051** −0.223*** −0.016
(0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.042) (0.021) (0.029) (0.016)
Wald test statistic (prob), Ho: Kpre-crisis = Kcrisis 37.28 [0.000] 57.53 [0.000] 6.52 [0.011] 27.45 [0.000]
II. Quarterly observations
Tier 1 capital ratio (K) 0.048* −0.065** 0.070*** −0.075*** 0.170** 0.068* −0.196*** −0.012
(0.026) (0.025) (0.020) (0.023) (0.070) (0.036) (0.053) (0.028)
Wald test statistic (prob), Ho: Kpre-crisis = Kcrisis 10.73 [0.001] 23.65 [0.000] 1.24 [0.265] 6.24 [0.013]
III. Controlling for capital requirements
Tier 1 capital ratio (K) 0.054*** −0.083*** 0.077*** −0.065*** 0.174*** 0.051** −0.195*** −0.016
(0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.040) (0.021) (0.028) (0.016)
Wald test statistic (prob), Ho: Kpre-crisis = Kcrisis 41.04 [0.000] 56.53 [0.000] 6.53 [0.012] 24.69 [0.000]
IV. Time ﬁxed-effects
Tier 1 capital ratio (K) 0.037** −0.100*** 0.083*** −0.099*** 0.199*** −0.176*** −0.278*** 0.315***
(0.016) (0.025) (0.014) (0.020) (0.039) (0.059) (0.028) (0.043)
Wald test statistic (prob), Ho: Kpre-crisis = Kcrisis 16.03 [0.000] 23.73 [0.000] 8.86 [0.003] 53.69 [0.000]
V. New business lending rates
Tier 1 capital ratio (K) −0.012 −0.050** −0.134*** −0.065*** −0.532*** −0.043 −0.025 −0.006
(0.063) (0.022) (0.042) (0.024) (0.103) (0.070) (0.037) (0.028)
Wald test statistic (prob), Ho: Kpre-crisis = Kcrisis 0.38 [0.539] 1.24 [0.265] 9.69 [0.002] 0.11 [0.740]
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the coefﬁcient of Tier 1 capital ratio in model (3) for lending rates. Panel I reproduces the estimates obtained in Table 2 for comparison. Panel II
pertains to the estimation based on quarterly data. Panel III pertains to model (3) with capital requirements as additional control. Panel IV reports results for model (3) with time ﬁxed
effects instead of the macroeconomic variables. Panel V reports results for new business lending rates. In all cases, the data are monthly from October 1998 to June 2007 (pre-crisis)
and from July 2007 to December 2012 (crisis) except for Panel V where the pre-crisis period is shorter from January 2004 to June 2007 due to data constraints on new business lending
rates. See note to Table 1 for variable deﬁnitions. The numbers in parentheses are Newey–West h.a.c. standard errors. The numbers in square brackets are p-values.
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cantly negative pre-crisis to signiﬁcantly positive in crisis. The Wald
test statistic now rejects theno-change null hypothesis in the coefﬁcient
K for all three sub-categories of lending as well as all-loans.
Finally Panel V reports the re-estimation of K in the long-run
model, Eq. (3), once again with the crisis dummy interacted with
all variables but now using new business lending rates as the depen-
dent variable. Here, not surprisingly since we are losing two thirds of
our pre-crisis sample (the estimation period is 2004–2012, as noted
in Section 3.4) there is a substantial change in the pre-crisis coefﬁ-
cient estimates for K. Reassuringly, the coefﬁcient estimates for the
crisis period are relatively little changed. The coefﬁcient K on the
capital ratio is now negative in all cases, both pre-crisis and during
the crisis-period. This ﬁnal robustness test suggests the possibility
of further instability in the capital ratio versus lending rate relation-
ship of interest within the pre-crisis period. These estimation results
should be interpreted with caution however since, as noted earlier,
the available portfolio-risk control variables and loan market share
all refer to existing business lending.
5. Conclusions
This paper reports estimates of the relationship between bank capi-
tal and bank lending rates over the period 1998–2012 using data on the
13 largest UK banks that account for around 75% of UK lending. For
household secured loans we ﬁnd a positive long-run relationship be-
tween capitalisation and loan interest rates in the pre-2007 period
(‘good times’) and a negative relationship during the subsequent period
(‘bad times’). For unsecured household lending we ﬁnd instead a posi-
tive association in both sub-periods but with a substantial and signiﬁ-
cant change in magnitude from pre-crisis to crisis (from relatively
strong to weak, respectively). Finally, for corporate loans we ﬁnd a neg-
ative association pre-crisis and no association during the sample period
that includes the crisis.
This ﬁnding of pronounced cyclical instability in the relationship
between bank capital and lending rates is difﬁcult to reconcile with
many well-established theories of bank decision-making. We havePlease cite this article as: Osborne, M., et al., In good times and in bad: Bank
ysis (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2016.02.005reviewed theories in which bank capital is needed to provide banks
with the incentive to apply effort to screening and monitoring of
loans and also models of the impact of bank capitalisation on bank
choices about portfolio risk and return. These analyses offer a variety
of predictions about the relationship between bank capital and lend-
ing rates, but they all suggest that this relationship should be stable
over time once fully controlling for aggregate macroeconomic and
bank-speciﬁc factors.
Our reported coefﬁcient instability might reﬂect shifts in the distri-
bution of loan demand and therefore be consistent with these well-
established theories of banking. For example, the instability may be a
consequence of a pre-crisis shift in the distribution of the demand for
lending across banks according to their particular regional or sectoral
customer exposure that was subsequently reversed. Despite controlling
for aggregate determinants of bank loan demand by including macro-
economic variables in our regressions (and replacing these with time-
speciﬁc effects in a robustness check), we cannot deﬁnitively rule out
the possibility of such a compositional shift in demand.
Still a plausible interpretation of our ﬁnding of instability in the pa-
rameter measuring the association between bank capital ratios and
lending rates is that it is a consequence of cyclical mechanisms
highlighted in the newer theoretical perspectives on bank decision-
making that have emerged since the crisis. This recent literature sug-
gests a variety of reasons for why the bankwillingness to accept risk ex-
posuremay vary between periods of rapid credit expansion and periods
of slow credit expansion or even contraction.
The precise mechanisms involved merit exploration. For exam-
ple, some banks may have been more optimistic than others about
future returns during the pre-crisis period and, as a result, operated
with comparatively low levels of capital and accepted relatively
high portfolio risk. Then, with the onset of the crisis, these same
banks may have found themselves over-extended and needed to re-
duce portfolio risk. Further research is required on a wider range of
bank decisions, and for other countries and time periods, to establish
which variants of these newer theories of cyclical changes of bank le-
verage and risk-appetite offer the best explanations of observed
bank portfolio and loan decisions. Work is also warranted on thecapital ratios and lending rates, International Review of Financial Anal-
11M. Osborne et al. / International Review of Financial Analysis xxx (2016) xxx–xxximpact of minimum regulatory capital requirements and of the
newly introduced regulatory capital buffers, for example, the ‘capital
conservation buffer’ in Basel III, both in expansionary and contrac-
tionary phases of the credit cycle.14
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